Axiomatizations and a Noncooperative Interpretation of the α-CIS Value
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Publication:3455875
DOI10.1142/S0217595915500311zbMath1330.90050MaRDI QIDQ3455875
Han Dai, Haobin Shi, Gen-Jiu Xu
Publication date: 11 December 2015
Published in: Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (6)
Sharing the surplus and proportional values ⋮ Process and optimization implementation of the \(\alpha \)-ENSC value ⋮ Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value ⋮ The general compromise value for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games ⋮ The family of ideal values for cooperative games
Cites Work
- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
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