The Core of Voting Games: A Partition Approach

DOI10.1142/S0219198915500012zbMath1331.91022MaRDI QIDQ3459189

Aymeric Lardon

Publication date: 21 December 2015

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

corevoting gamespartition approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
• On the core of voting games
• The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
• Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• N‐person games in partition function form

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