SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS

DOI10.1111/iere.12124zbMath1404.91080OpenAlexW2140486537MaRDI QIDQ3459209

Brian Knight, Patrick Hummel

Publication date: 21 December 2015

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18076.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

social learningvotingsequential electionsquantitative welfare analysissimultaneous elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (1)

Super tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections

Cites Work

• Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries
• Herding with collective preferences
• Sequential voting with abstention
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare
• Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting

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