Stochastic Approach for Determining Stable Coalition Structure

DOI10.1142/S0219198915500097zbMath1331.91024OpenAlexW1919761736MaRDI QIDQ3459302

Artem Sedakov, Elena M. Parilina

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198915500097

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuestochastic gameTU-gamestationary strategyfeasible coalitionstable coalition structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (1)

Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment

Cites Work

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids
• The Shapley value for games on matroids: the static model
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• The Owen value applied to games with graph-restricted communication
• A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
• Non-cooperative games
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• A GENERIC APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• DYNAMIC GAMES WITH COALITIONAL STRUCTURES
• Stochastic Games

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