Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
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Publication:3460334
DOI10.1137/13094339XzbMath1330.91095OpenAlexW2270382553MaRDI QIDQ3460334
Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, N. V. Gravin
Publication date: 7 January 2016
Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/13094339x
Analysis of algorithms (68W40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25)
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Optimal item pricing in online combinatorial auctions ⋮ Fair Division of Indivisible Goods for a Class of Concave Valuations ⋮ A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets ⋮ Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Approximating the revenue maximization problem with sharp demands ⋮ Market Pricing for Matroid Rank Valuations ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect
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