The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_4zbMath1406.91274arXiv1504.03257OpenAlexW1742188079MaRDI QIDQ3460776

Nicole Immorlica, Nick Arnosti, Brendan Lucier

Publication date: 8 January 2016

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.03257

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matching marketsincomplete information environmentsentry-level labor market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
• The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*

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