Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13zbMath1406.91158OpenAlexW2296522944MaRDI QIDQ3460787

Liad Blumrosen, Osnat Zohar

Publication date: 8 January 2016

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13

zbMATH Keywords

supply chainsdeferred-acceptance auctionsmultilateral markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Beyond Moulin mechanisms
• A dominant strategy double auction
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Modularity and greed in double auctions
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism

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