Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_17zbMath1406.91164arXiv1509.09147OpenAlexW2263506547MaRDI QIDQ3460791

Yun Kuen Cheung, Martin Starnberger, Martin Hoefer, Monika R. Henzinger

Publication date: 8 January 2016

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.09147

zbMATH Keywords

externalitiescombinatorial auctionssocial welfare maximizationgraph-theoretic models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (1)

Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities

Cites Work

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• Approximation resistance from pairwise independent subgroups
• Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

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