Applications of $$\alpha $$-Strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_18zbMath1406.91165arXiv1512.02285OpenAlexW2780469162MaRDI QIDQ3460792

Shravas Rao, Richard John Cole

Publication date: 8 January 2016

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1512.02285

zbMATH Keywords

regular distributionsmonotone hazard rateBayesian auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets

Cites Work

• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
• Optimal Auction Design
• The sample complexity of revenue maximization

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