Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_22zbMath1406.91144arXiv1406.0576OpenAlexW2098533313MaRDI QIDQ3460797

Omri Weinstein, Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Publication date: 8 January 2016

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.0576

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriummarket clearancepricing bundles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (4)

Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium ⋮ Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium ⋮ On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets ⋮ Mechanism design for perturbation stable combinatorial auctions

Cites Work

• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• The package assignment model.
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Clearing Markets via Bundles
• Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium
• Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions
• Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium
• Unnamed Item

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