Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_24zbMath1404.91050OpenAlexW2406330895MaRDI QIDQ3460799

Dimitris Kalimeris, Dimitris Fotakis, Thanasis Lianeas

Publication date: 8 January 2016

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_24

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionprice of anarchyrouting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (7)

Tight inefficiency bounds for perception-parameterized affine congestion games ⋮ Price of anarchy for parallel link networks with generalized mean objective ⋮ The impact of worst-case deviations in non-atomic network routing games ⋮ Toll caps in privatized road networks ⋮ Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players ⋮ Risk-Averse Selfish Routing ⋮ Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators

Cites Work

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• Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
• Stochastic Congestion Games with Risk-Averse Players
• Computing Optimal Tolls with Arc Restrictions and Heterogeneous Players
• Efficiency of Restricted Tolls in Non-atomic Network Routing Games
• Stochastic Selfish Routing
• When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers
• The Recognition of Series Parallel Digraphs
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks

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