A Selective Tour Through Congestion Games
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Publication:3464474
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-24024-4_14zbMath1331.91009OpenAlexW1648128383MaRDI QIDQ3464474
Publication date: 27 January 2016
Published in: Algorithms, Probability, Networks, and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24024-4_14
Related Items (2)
The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network Routing ⋮ Leadership in singleton congestion games: what is hard and what is easy
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