Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
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Publication:3470211
DOI10.2307/2297540zbMath0694.90015OpenAlexW1979907663MaRDI QIDQ3470211
Georg Nöldeke, Eric E. C. van Damme
Publication date: 1990
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/f8bf19e7-ac45-45e3-a8ea-6d91a5021afd
incomplete informationdynamic competitionjob market signalling modelmultiplicity of sequential equilibrianever weak best response
Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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