Optimal Cheating And Inspection Strategies Under A Chemical Weapons Treaty

DOI10.1080/03155986.1990.11732116zbMath0695.90109OpenAlexW2407137010MaRDI QIDQ3471893

D. Marc Kilgour

Publication date: 1990

Published in: INFOR: Information Systems and Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.1990.11732116

zbMATH Keywords

optimal strategiesvaluecheatinginspection strategiestwo-person zero-sum sequential game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

The use of costless inspection in enforcement ⋮ Inspection games in arms control

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