A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
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Publication:3475091
DOI10.2307/2298021zbMath0697.90004OpenAlexW2249081876MaRDI QIDQ3475091
Guido Tabellini, Alberto Alesina
Publication date: 1990
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298021
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