Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
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Publication:3483043
DOI10.2307/2298018zbMath0703.90021OpenAlexW2051805744WikidataQ29541757 ScholiaQ29541757MaRDI QIDQ3483043
Andrew Postlewaite, George J. Mailath
Publication date: 1990
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298018
Group preferences (91B10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)
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