Strategic Information Revelation
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Publication:3483115
DOI10.2307/2297541zbMath0703.90103OpenAlexW1972933860MaRDI QIDQ3483115
Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Kotaro Suzumura, Andrew Postlewaite
Publication date: 1990
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297541
information revelationsellerBayes-Nash equilibriumbuyerasymmetric information gameoligopolistsnonpublic information
Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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