A REFINEMENT CONCEPT FOR EQUILIBRIA IN MULTICRITERIA GAMES VIA STABLE SCALARIZATIONS

DOI10.1142/S0219198907001345zbMath1139.91311MaRDI QIDQ3502813

Giuseppe De Marco, Jacqueline Morgan

Publication date: 20 May 2008

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

perturbationrefinementmulticriteria gamePareto Nash equilibriumscalarization-stable equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

A set optimization approach to zero-sum matrix games with multi-dimensional payoffs ⋮ Rationalizable strategies in games with incomplete preferences ⋮ A variational approach to the maximization of preferences without numerical representation ⋮ Rationalizability in multicriteria games ⋮ Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria ⋮ Unawareness of decision criteria in multicriteria games ⋮ Decision making and games with vector outcomes

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Approximations and well-posedness in multicriteria games
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A perfectness concept for multicriteria games
• Existence of a Pareto equilibrium
• Essential components of the set of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium points
• Non-cooperative games
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Set-valued analysis

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