ON BARGAINING BASED POINT SOLUTION TO COOPERATIVE TU GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198907001461zbMath1139.91308MaRDI QIDQ3502826

Amit K. Biswas, A. Sugumaran, V. Thangaraj

Publication date: 20 May 2008

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

corecoalitionimputationbargaining settransferable utilitycooperative game in characteristic function formbargaining value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (1)

AVERAGE RULES FOR COOPERATIVE TU GAMES

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A consistent bargaining set
• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
• A game with no solution
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Existence theorem for the bargaining set 𝑀₁^{(𝑖)}

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