ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY
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Publication:3502854
DOI10.1142/S0219198907001655zbMath1200.91011OpenAlexW1965932585MaRDI QIDQ3502854
Fuhito Kojima, Satoru Takahashii
Publication date: 20 May 2008
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198907001655
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