A NOTE ON LUENBERGER'S ZERO-MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR CORE ALLOCATIONS

DOI10.1142/S0219198907001527zbMath1213.91029OpenAlexW2025012327MaRDI QIDQ3502888

Naïla Hayek, Jean-Michel Courtault, Bertrand Crettez

Publication date: 20 May 2008

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198907001527

zbMATH Keywords

corebenefit functionsdistributable surpluszero-maximum principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

• Benefit functions and duality
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