WAGE NEGOTIATION UNDER GOOD FAITH BARGAINING

DOI10.1142/S021919890700159XzbMath1140.91314MaRDI QIDQ3502896

Quan Wen, Jesse A. Schwartz

Publication date: 20 May 2008

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Discrete-time games (91A50) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (4)

Sequential bargaining with common values ⋮ Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion ⋮ Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion

Cites Work

• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Joint Projects without Commitment

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