Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-68880-8_17zbMath1143.91320OpenAlexW1531597546MaRDI QIDQ3511426

Piotr Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, Lane A., Jörg Rothe, Edith Hemaspaandra

Publication date: 10 July 2008

Published in: Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/4630

zbMATH Keywords

multiagent systemspreference aggregationComputational social choice theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

Tennis manipulation: can we help Serena Williams win another tournament? Or can we control a knockout tournament with reasonable complexity? ⋮ The complexity of probabilistic lobbying ⋮ Gerrymandering on graphs: computational complexity and parameterized algorithms ⋮ Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election ⋮ Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control ⋮ A parameterized perspective on protecting elections ⋮ Computational complexity characterization of protecting elections from bribery ⋮ Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control ⋮ Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control ⋮ Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems ⋮ Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems ⋮ Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems

Cites Work

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• Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• How hard is it to control an election?
• Copeland method. II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes
• The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
• Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
• On Approximating Optimal Weighted Lobbying, and Frequency of Correctness Versus Average-Case Polynomial Time
• Guarantees for the Success Frequency of an Algorithm for Finding Dodgson-Election Winners

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