Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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Publication:3516412
DOI10.1239/JAP/1214950355zbMath1144.91304OpenAlexW2054675685MaRDI QIDQ3516412
Yunshyong Chow, Hsiao-Chi Chen
Publication date: 5 August 2008
Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1239/jap/1214950355
Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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