Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring

DOI10.1239/JAP/1214950355zbMath1144.91304OpenAlexW2054675685MaRDI QIDQ3516412

Yunshyong Chow, Hsiao-Chi Chen

Publication date: 5 August 2008

Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1239/jap/1214950355

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect monitoringcoordination gamerisk-dominant equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Evolution with changing mutation rates
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• The statistical mechanics of best-response strategy revision
• Expectations, drift, and volatility in evolutionary games
• On the convergence of evolution processes with time-varying mutations and local interaction
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

This page was built for publication: Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring