Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-75254-7_29zbMath1151.68680OpenAlexW1483504834MaRDI QIDQ3527275

Emmanuel Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin

Publication date: 25 September 2008

Published in: Multi-Agent Systems and Applications V (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75254-7_29

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of languages and software systems (knowledge-based systems, expert systems, etc.) for artificial intelligence (68T35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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