A FUZZY LOGIC AND DEFAULT REASONING MODEL OF SOCIAL NORMS AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES UNDER UNFORESEEN CONTINGENCIES

DOI10.1142/S0218488508005042zbMath1197.91034OpenAlexW3125418278MaRDI QIDQ3534121

Lorenzo Sacconi, Stefano Moretti

Publication date: 3 November 2008

Published in: International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0218488508005042

zbMATH Keywords

Fuzzy logicPossibility theorySocial normsEquilibrium selectionDefault reasoningUnforeseen contingencies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Fuzzy and other nonstochastic uncertainty mathematical programming (90C70) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Fuzzy sets and logic (in connection with information, communication, or circuits theory) (94D05)

Cites Work

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• A logic for default reasoning
• Fuzzy sets as a basis for a theory of possibility
• Agreeing to disagree
• Addition as fuzzy mutual entropy
• The epistemic structure of a theory of a game
• Modeling agents as qualitative decision makers
• A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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