Modelling Attacker’s Knowledge for Cascade Cryptographic Protocols

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-87603-8_20zbMath1156.94334OpenAlexW1538770043MaRDI QIDQ3535379

Nazim Benassa

Publication date: 11 November 2008

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00336641/file/ABZ2008benaissa.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cryptographyformal methodsmodel for attacker

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (1)

Formalization in PVS of Balancing Properties Necessary for Proving Security of the Dolev-Yao Cascade Protocol Model

Cites Work

• Isabelle. A generic theorem prover
• On the security of public key protocols
• The B-Book
• Incremental Parametric Development of Greedy Algorithms

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