Mathematics and Politics
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Publication:3536778
DOI10.1007/978-0-387-77645-3zbMath1151.91005OpenAlexW4296397896MaRDI QIDQ3536778
Alan D. Taylor, Allison M. Pacelli
Publication date: 24 November 2008
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77645-3
Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) History, political science (91F10) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)
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