A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-87744-8_25zbMath1158.90345arXiv0807.3427OpenAlexW2166185632MaRDI QIDQ3541092

Elias Koutsoupias, Angelina Vidali, George Christodoulou

Publication date: 25 November 2008

Published in: Algorithms - ESA 2008 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3427

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35)

Related Items (7)

Setting lower bounds on truthfulness ⋮ The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions ⋮ Copula-based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines ⋮ A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms ⋮ A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing ⋮ No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems ⋮ The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design

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