Weakened notions of equilibria and optimality in conflict problems

DOI10.1134/S0012266113030117zbMath1269.91013OpenAlexW1991924678MaRDI QIDQ354514

E. R. Smol'yakov

Publication date: 19 July 2013

Published in: Differential Equations (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0012266113030117

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalityconflict stabilitySlater optimalityweak equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multiobjective variational problems, Pareto optimality, applications to economics, etc. (58E17)

Related Items (1)

New notions of conflict equilibria and differential games

Cites Work

• Strongest equilibria for conflict problems and differential games
• Weak equilibria in differential games with partially intersecting interests of participants
• Improvement on ``quantum key agreement protocol with maximally entangled states
• Useful equilibria for game theory
• Non-cooperative games
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