Stackelberg problems with followers in the grand coalition of a TU-game

DOI10.1007/S10203-011-0122-2zbMath1268.91016OpenAlexW2039474092MaRDI QIDQ354662

Mohammad Hasan, M. Dambrine

Publication date: 19 July 2013

Published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-011-0122-2

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecoreleader-followerStakelberg equilibriumTU-games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Stackelberg differential games in economic models
• CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SYMMETRIC POTENTIAL GAMES
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