ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2009.00324.XzbMath1202.91229OpenAlexW1966717527MaRDI QIDQ3553246

Li Qin, Eleftherios Spyromitros, Moïse Sidiropoulos

Publication date: 22 April 2010

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2009.00324.x

zbMATH Keywords

robust controlmodel uncertaintycentral bank opacitymin-max policies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (1)

STATIC AND DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Solution of macromodels with Hansen-Sargent robust policies: some extensions

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