UNIQUENESS IN RANDOM-PROPOSER MULTILATERAL BARGAINING

DOI10.1142/S0219198909002406zbMath1193.91059OpenAlexW3125495863MaRDI QIDQ3560090

Huibin Yan

Publication date: 19 May 2010

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002406

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionuniquerandom proposermultilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Dynamic multilateral markets ⋮ Equality in legislative bargaining ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application

Cites Work

• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Noncooperative selection of the core
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Multilateral Bargaining
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities

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