A NEW SEQUENCE FORM APPROACH FOR THE ENUMERATION AND REFINEMENT OF ALL EXTREME NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES

DOI10.1142/S021919890900242XzbMath1193.91019MaRDI QIDQ3560092

Slim Belhaiza, Charles Audet, Pierre Hansen

Publication date: 19 May 2010

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumenumerationextensive gamesequence formextreme equilibriumE\(_{\chi }\)MIP algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) 2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (5)

Enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games ⋮ On proper refinement of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games ⋮ On perfect Nash equilibria of polymatrix games ⋮ A note on bimatrix game maximal Selten subsets ⋮ Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist

Cites Work

• Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
• The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
• Finding mixed strategies with small supports in extensive form games
• Efficient computation of behavior strategies
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
• Computing Equilibria of Two-Person Games from the Extensive Form

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