ON COOPERATIVE GAMES RELATED TO MARKET SITUATIONS AND AUCTIONS

DOI10.1142/S0219198909002443zbMath1190.91013OpenAlexW2040846606MaRDI QIDQ3560094

Vito Fragnelli, Rodica Branzei, S. H. Tijs, Ana Meca

Publication date: 19 May 2010

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002443

zbMATH Keywords

market gamesbig boss gamesone-object auction situationspeer group gamesring games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ The Shapley value in the Knaster gain game ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ RANKING AUCTIONS: A COOPERATIVE APPROACH

Cites Work

• Cores of convex games
• Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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