A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONVERGENCE OF STATISTICAL TO STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA OF MARKET GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198909002467zbMath1190.91070OpenAlexW2016534036MaRDI QIDQ3560097

Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, Dimitris Voliotis

Publication date: 19 May 2010

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002467

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitymarket gamesrational learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Weak and strong merging of opinions
• A strategic market game with seigniorage costs of fiat money
• Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: A probabilistic choice approach
• Strategic market games: an introduction.
• Relative entropy in sequential decision problems
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Strategic market games quantal response equilibria
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• The optimal bankruptcy rule in a trading economy using fiat money

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