Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals

DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00581.xzbMath1231.91089OpenAlexW3124668775MaRDI QIDQ3563635

Philip Bond, Hülya Eraslan

Publication date: 1 June 2010

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00581.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (7)

Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy ⋮ DECIDING WHEN TO DECIDE: COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION AND OBSTRUCTION ⋮ Equity bargaining with common value ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ RETROSPECTIVE VOTING AND PARTY POLARIZATION ⋮ A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood ⋮ Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees

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