Caveat preemptor: coordination failure and success in a duopoly investment game

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.10.034zbMath1268.91076OpenAlexW2086017554MaRDI QIDQ356576

Bruno Versaevel, Etienne Billette De Villemeur, Richard Ruble

Publication date: 26 July 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.034

zbMATH Keywords

real optionsinvestment valuationpre-emption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (2)

The Effect of Vertical Relationships on Investment Timing ⋮ Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics

Cites Work

• Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
• Unnamed Item

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