Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.11.008zbMath1268.91101OpenAlexW3123022311MaRDI QIDQ356592

Francois Larmande

Publication date: 26 July 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.11.008

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachmoral hazardlimited liabilitylikelihood ratio distributionmean preserving spread criterion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• Unnamed Item

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