Power or loss aversion? Reinterpreting the bargaining weights in search and matching models

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.11.034zbMath1268.91075OpenAlexW2041118577WikidataQ105667243 ScholiaQ105667243MaRDI QIDQ356609

Francesco Giuli, Enrico Marchetti, Giuseppe Ciccarone

Publication date: 26 July 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.11.034

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversionNash bargainingsearch and matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Search frictions and labor market dynamics in a real business cycle model with undeclared work

Cites Work

• Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
• Loss aversion and bargaining
• Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment