A Timing Attack against the Secret Permutation in the McEliece PKC

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-12929-2_8zbMath1284.94115OpenAlexW1602905584MaRDI QIDQ3569140

Falko Strenzke

Publication date: 17 June 2010

Published in: Post-Quantum Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12929-2_8

zbMATH Keywords

code-based cryptographyside channel attackpost quantum cryptographytiming attack

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94)

Related Items (7)

Toward secure implementation of McEliece decryption ⋮ On Weak Keys and Forgery Attacks Against Polynomial-Based MAC Schemes ⋮ Roadmap of post-quantum cryptography standardization: side-channel attacks and countermeasures ⋮ Key-recovery by side-channel information on the matrix-vector product in code-based cryptosystems ⋮ DAGS: key encapsulation using dyadic GS codes ⋮ Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem ⋮ A key-recovery timing attack on post-quantum primitives using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation and its application on FrodoKEM

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