Principal and Expert Agent

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1528zbMath1192.91130OpenAlexW2142660849MaRDI QIDQ3573064

James M. Malcomson

Publication date: 30 June 2010

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2a2060a5-9fb5-40d5-8ba3-53937e9fa60f

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionrisk aversionoptimal biddingrisky investmentprincipal-agent contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (5)

Collaborative product development: managing supplier incentives for key component testing ⋮ Robust incentives for information acquisition ⋮ Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise ⋮ Motivating informed decisions ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering

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