The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
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Publication:3576882
DOI10.3982/ECTA6420zbMath1194.91044OpenAlexW2171879706MaRDI QIDQ3576882
Yuliy Sannikov, Andrzej Skrzypacz
Publication date: 3 August 2010
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6420
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