Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation

DOI10.3982/ECTA8011zbMath1194.91052OpenAlexW1958745823MaRDI QIDQ3576883

Bruno Strulovici

Publication date: 3 August 2010

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8011

zbMATH Keywords

banditlearningvotingsocial choiceexperimentationreform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Hierarchical experimentation ⋮ Keeping your options open ⋮ Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options ⋮ DECIDING WHEN TO DECIDE: COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION AND OBSTRUCTION ⋮ A perpetual search for talents across overlapping generations: a learning process ⋮ Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective ⋮ Intervention uncertainty, household health, and pandemic ⋮ Leadership ability and agenda choice ⋮ Policy experimentation with repeated elections ⋮ The K-armed bandit problem with multiple priors ⋮ Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types ⋮ Learning aversion and voting rules in collective decision making ⋮ Dynamic pricing in the presence of individual learning ⋮ Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium ⋮ Strategic experimentation in queues ⋮ Personal power dynamics in bargaining

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