Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
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Publication:3576885
DOI10.3982/ECTA6640zbMath1194.91089OpenAlexW1506388421MaRDI QIDQ3576885
Juan-José Ganuza, José S. Penalva
Publication date: 3 August 2010
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6640
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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