Optimal Mandates and the Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence From the U.K. Annuity Market

DOI10.3982/ECTA7245zbMath1194.91156WikidataQ33946335 ScholiaQ33946335MaRDI QIDQ3576886

Paul Schrimpf, Amy Finkelstein, Liran Einav

Publication date: 3 August 2010

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionstructural estimationannuitiescontract choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82)

Related Items (5)

Asset Liability Management of Longevity and Interest Rate Risks: Using Survival–Mortality Bonds ⋮ Optimal choice of health and retirement in a life-cycle model ⋮ Government-provided annuities under insolvency risk ⋮ NATURAL HEDGES WITH IMMUNIZATION STRATEGIES OF MORTALITY AND INTEREST RATES ⋮ Why do we postpone annuity purchases?

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