Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms

DOI10.1108/03684920910994295zbMath1192.91134OpenAlexW1991131861MaRDI QIDQ3579142

Wenxia You, Xian-Jia Wang

Publication date: 5 August 2010

Published in: Kybernetes (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1108/03684920910994295

zbMATH Keywords

cyberneticscontracts of employmentemployee behaviourmoral hazardspay

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Repeated moral hazard with persistence
• Economic yoyos and never‐perfect value systems
• Economic yoyos and Becker's Rotten Kid theorem
• Economic yoyos, parasites and child labor
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective

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