Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users

DOI10.1145/780542.780618zbMath1192.68032OpenAlexW2099481767MaRDI QIDQ3581254

Yevgeniy Dodis, Tim Roughgarden, Richard John Cole

Publication date: 16 August 2010

Published in: Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/780542.780618

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (32)

On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users ⋮ Existence and computation of optimal tolls in multiclass network equilibrium problems ⋮ Coordination mechanisms ⋮ On the stability of finding approximate fixed points by simplicial methods ⋮ Optimal externalities in a parallel transportation network ⋮ Negative prices in network pricing games ⋮ Transfer implementation in congestion games ⋮ The Cost of Free Spectrum ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Demand allocation with latency cost functions ⋮ A network pricing game for selfish traffic ⋮ Non-atomic one-round walks in congestion games ⋮ Toll caps in privatized road networks ⋮ The minimum tollbooth problem in atomic network congestion games with unsplittable flows ⋮ The toll effect on price of anarchy when costs are nonlinear and asymmetric ⋮ Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms ⋮ A generalized two-agent location problem: Asymmetric dynamics and coordination ⋮ How much can taxes help selfish routing? ⋮ On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard ⋮ Pricing bridges to cross a river ⋮ Tradeoffs in worst-case equilibria ⋮ Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions ⋮ An incentive compatible, efficient market for air traffic flow management ⋮ Bertrand Competition in Networks ⋮ Stackelberg network pricing is hard to approximate ⋮ Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for selfish users with elastic demands ⋮ Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks ⋮ Wealth Inequality and the Price of Anarchy ⋮ Dynamic Coordination of Multiple Agents in a Class of Differential Games Through a Generalized Linear Reward Scheme ⋮ Inducing coordination in supply chains through linear reward schemes ⋮ Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks ⋮ Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators

This page was built for publication: Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users