Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
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Publication:3581383
DOI10.1145/1060590.1060597zbMath1192.90161OpenAlexW1982492546MaRDI QIDQ3581383
Berthold Vöcking, Patrick Briest, Piotr Krysta
Publication date: 16 August 2010
Published in: Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060597
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