An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
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Publication:3581517
DOI10.1145/1109557.1109675zbMath1192.91102OpenAlexW4245400518MaRDI QIDQ3581517
Shahar Dobzinski, Michael Schapira
Publication date: 16 August 2010
Published in: Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm - SODA '06 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1109557.1109675
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)
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